Comity Be Damned: The Use of Antisuit Injunctions Against the Courts of a Foreignnation by Roberson, Eric
COMMENTS
COMITY BE DAMNED: THE USE OF ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS
AGAINST THE COURTS OF A FOREIGN NATION
ERIC ROBERSONt
INTRODUCTION
Kaepa, Inc., an American shoe manufacturing corporation, and Achilles
Corporation, a Japanese distributor, entered into a distributorship agreement
in April, 1993.1 By July of 1994, the two companies had suffered a falling
out, and Kaepa filed suit in Texas state court, alleging fraud and negligent
misrepresentation by Achilles to induce Kaepa to enter the agreement, and
breach of contract by Achilles.2 After having the case removed to federal
court, Achilles brought suit in its home country alleging "mirror-image"
claims that Kaepa induced Achilles to enter into the contract through fraud,
and that Kaepa had been the one who breached the contract? Such closely
related claims would doubtless have qualified as "compulsory" counter-
claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) had they been brought
in a U.S. federal court.4 Instead, however, the claims were brought in a
t B.A. 1996, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Pennsylva-
nia. For setting me on the path to publication, I would initially like to mention my debt to
Professor Emeritus A. Leo Levin. In addition, I wish to express my gratitude to the members
of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for their patience and understanding in pre-
paring this piece. Yet, this work must truly be dedicated to my parents, Doy and Gloria
Roberson, for without their support I would never have made it this far. Finally, in preparing
this piece I have often been reminded of the words of William Cowper:
Knowledge is proud that he has learn'd so much;
Wisdom is humble that he knows no more.
The Task, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF WILLIAM COWPER, bk. 6, 11. 96-97, at 221 (H.S. Ml-
ford ed., 4th ed. 1934).
1 See Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 625-26 (5th Cir. 1996) (detailing the
arrangement).
2 See id. at 626.
' See id.
4 FED. R. CrV. P. 13(a) (the compulsory counterclaim rule); see Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 628
n.14 (noting, but declining to resolve, whether Rule 13 should apply to claims brought in for-
eign courts).
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court of a foreign sovereign presumably not subject to American rules of
court procedure, setting the stage for yet another round in what has become
a recurring debate amongst the federal courts: how to balance the "interests
of comity" between courts with the "equitable factors favoring an injunc-
tion." 5
The district court with jurisdiction over the Kaepa action eventually
ruled that Rule 13(a) applied, even with respect to the courts of Japan, and
entered an injunction against Achilles's further pursuit of its claims in Ja-
pan.6 Calling the Japanese action "'an absurd duplication of effort"' 7 that
would "result in unwarranted inconvenience, expense, and vexation," the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the injunction.8 Thus, the courts of
a foreign sovereign, Japan, were entirely deprived of the right to hear a case
brought before them, as a result of another sovereign's, the United States's,
rule of court procedure.
The instinct that there is something untoward about a federal court en-
joining proceedings in the courts of another sovereign on the basis of noth-
ing more than a domestic rule of procedure has led to a rather sharp divide
between the circuit courts9 and a variety of scholarly treatments 0 on what
standards to apply before taking any action. This lack of uniformity in is-
suing injunctions calls into question the significance and applicability of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outside of the federal judicial system; im-
plicates concerns for federalism and comity between the courts;1 and raises
5 China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 1987) (con-
cluding that comity outweighed the "equitable factors favoring an injunction").
6 See Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 626 (noting the district court's grant of Kaepa's motion to enjoin,
and Achilles's subsequent appeal).
7 Id. at 627 (quoting Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431 (7th
Cir. 1993)).
8 Id.
9 The split between the circuits is detailed infra Part I.C.
10 A number of these authors argue that, especially in the international setting, actions in
the courts of another sovereign should almost never be interfered with. See, e.g., Haig Na-
jarian, Note, Granting Comity Its Due: A Proposal to Revive the Comity-Based Approach to
TransnationalAntisuit Injunctions, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 961, 967 (1994) (emphasizing the
importance of according "due deference to principles of international comity"). This Com-
ment will restrict itself, however, to the contention that injunctions against the courts of an-
other sovereign, whether it be a domestic state or a foreign nation, should be governed by
similar policies of limited interference.
1 "Comity" is defined as "[c]ourtesy; complaisance; respect; a willingness to grant a
privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will.' BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990). "In general, [the] principle of 'comity' is that courts of one
state or jurisdiction will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdic-
tion, not as a matter of obligation but out of deference and mutual respect." Id.
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the specter of one of the nation's oldest statutes, the Anti-Injunction Act of
1793 (the "AIA").12
At the domestic level, there are several separate standards for judging
the appropriateness of issuing an antisuit injunction against another court. If
the two courts are both part of the federal court system, the standard is rela-
tively lax, since the two courts can be assumed to share a common interest
in the efficient management of the federal system.13  However, when the
two courts are from different sovereign court systems-that is, when one is
a federal court while the other is a state court-the issuance of antisuit in-
junctions is generally barred by the AIA unless one of three conditions is
met.
14
In the international setting, however, a controversy has erupted between
the circuit courts over how to handle the issuance of antisuit injunctions by
a federal court against proceedings in the courts of a foreign sovereign.' 5 A
number of circuits use a standard akin to that governing the use of these in-
junctions between the federal courts-requiring nothing more than duplica-
tion of the parties and issues to justify the issuance of an injunction. 16 A
12 Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334 (1793) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
2283 (1994)). The original Act severely limited the availability of antisuit injunctions as a
weapon to be used by federal courts against state courts. Since its last amendment in 1948,
the Supreme Court has continued to refine the scope of the Act and the exceptions to it. See,
e.g., Huffinan v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608-09 (1975) (holding that strict "standards
must be met to justify federal intervention in a state [civil] judicial proceeding as to which a
losing litigant has not exhausted his state appellate remedies"); Younger v: Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 43-45 (1971) (noting a strong judicial policy against federal interference with state crimi-
nal proceedings); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (allowing a state's ju-
dicial system to retain jurisdiction despite the possibility of an error in the state trial court's
holding on a constitutional issue).
13 See Adam v. Jacobs, 950 F.2d 89, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that between two fed-
eral courts, "the first suit should have priority," and all that is required to justify the issuance
by the first court of an antisuit injunction is a duplication of parties and issues). In these
situations, Rule 13(a)'s purpose of promoting efficiency through the elimination of duplica-
tive litigation is routinely cited to justify the issuance of an injunction. See 6 CHARLEs ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRAcTIcE AND PRoCEDURE § 1409, at 46 (2d ed. 1990) ("The rea-
son for compelling the litigant to interpose compulsory counterclaims is to enable the court to
settle all related claims in one action, thereby avoiding a wasteful multiplicity of litiga-
tion...."). Conflicts such as these, however, can often be avoided in the federal courts by
asking the court in the subsequent suit to either stay its proceedings or transfer the case pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
14 Briefly, the three conditions are: (1) as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, (2)
where necessary in aid of a court's jurisdiction, and (3) to protect or effectuate a court's
judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
15 For a description of the division between the circuits, see infra notes 16-17 and accom-
panying text.
16 Circuits utilizing this standard are the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth. See, e.g., Allen-
dale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 430 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that there
is a presumption in federal court against "abstain[ing] ... in favor of a parallel litigation
1998]
412 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
second set of circuits seems to treat the international situation more like an
injunction by a federal court against a state court, allowing their issuance
only when necessary to protect the forum's jurisdiction or to prevent eva-
sion of the forum's important public policies.
17
This Comment will argue that the use of antisuit injunctions in the in-
ternational setting closely resembles their use in the federal/state context,
and therefore that the same concerns that motivated the passage of the AIA
to govern injunctions between federal and state courts should dictate that a
similar rule govern in the international context.
18
Part I will examine the historical restrictions on the use of the antisuit
injunction-the most invasive enforcement mechanism available for use by
a U.S. federal court against a court of another sovereign. This Part also
contains an introduction to the AIA, which was first passed in 1793 to dras-
tically limit the use of precisely these types of injunctions by the federal
courts against the state courts.
Part II will introduce the modem practice of issuing antisuit injunctions
against foreign courts and will detail the rather dramatic split between the
circuits on this issue. Part II will conclude by examining the various tests
devised by the different circuit courts and the theories that support them.
Part III will merge the historical analyses in Parts L.A and II to develop
a proposed solution to the dilemma of determining the appropriate circum-
stances under which to issue an antisuit injunction against the courts of a
foreign sovereign. This Part will summarize how the courts and commen-
tators have dealt with the issue, and will then engage in a brief analysis of
some of the proposed solutions to the problem. Next, it will import the
pending in another court"); Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League,
652 F.2d 852, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); In re Unterweser Reederei, 428 F.2d 888, 896
(5th Cir. 1970) (holding that the district court's decision that "allowing simultaneous prosecu-
tion of the same action in a foreign forum thousands of miles away would result in 'inequita-
ble hardship' was within its discretion), vacated on other grounds sub nom. The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler,
Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578-79 (1st Cir. 1969) ("[C]omity ... must give way... in limited cir-
cumstances when relitigation would cover exactly the same points."). For a more detailed
discussion of the standard followed by these courts, see the discussion infra Part ]I.C.
17 The second set of circuits includes the Second, Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits. See,
e.g., Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354-55 (6th Cir. 1992) (emphasiz-
ing the need for more than just parallel proceedings to issue an injunction); Sea Containers
Ltd. v. Stena AB, 890 F.2d 1205, 1208-09 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (articulating a stringent standard
for granting an injunction); China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36
(2d Cir. 1987) (same); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651
F.2d 877, 887 (3d Cir. 1981) (same), affd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). This stan-
dard is also explained further in Part II.C infra.
18 Thus, this Comment agrees in principle with the approach taken by the Second, Third,
Sixth and D.C. Circuits, although I find the standard enunciated by this group of circuits to be
too open to uncertainty.
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analysis of the AIA from Part I.B to argue that the same concerns which
drove the enactment of the AIA should educate the debate over the interna-
tional use of antisuit injunctions. Finally, based upon this analysis, this
Comment will propose a solution to the challenges posed by the interna-
tional use of antisuit injunctions.
I. THE HISTORY AND USES OF ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS
A. The Early History
"Forasmuch as yourselves, My Lords, drive me to that necessity for awarding
our injunctions... you cannot hereafter any more justly blame me."
19
Antisuit injunctions have been called "the most practically important
class of injunctions." 20 Certainly, they are one of the most ancient and well-
established forms of injunction. Some of this device's early ancestors can
be traced back as far as Ancient Rome.21 In addition, it bears a marked
similarity to several of the writs granted by the early English monarchs. 22 It
was not until the rise of the Court of Chancery in the latter part of the four-
teenth century, however, that this type of injunction emerged in its modem
form.21
The early common law courts of England "administered both law and
equity."24 With few legal precedents to rely on, these early courts were
relatively free to tailor case-specific remedies.25 By the thirteenth century,
however, the common law courts began to lose their equitable nature and
were becoming "rigid, technical, and overly formal."26 This process of ossi-
19 5 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 223-24 (Methuen & Co.
1937) (quoting Sir Thomas More, Lord Chancellor of England from 1529 to 1532).
20 Id. at 335; see Michael David Schimek, Comment, Anti-Suit andAnti-Anti-Suit Injunc-
tions: A Proposed Texas Approach, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 499, 501 (1993) (noting the com-
plete bar represented by an antisuit injunction because "[a] court issuing an anti-suit injunc-
tion effectively eliminates the [other] court's ability to hear the dispute and decide for itself
whether to assert its jurisdiction").
21 See David W. Raack, A History of Injunctions in England Before 1700, 61 IND. L.J.
539, 540-50 (1986) (detailing the varieties of Ancient Roman "interdicts").
22 See id. (detailing the early English writs).
23 See id. at 550, 555 (noting that "Chancery did not become an adjudicatory body until
about 1380-1400," and that injunctions, including antisuit injunctions, "appeared in Chancery
as early as the 1390's").
24 Id. at 544 (explaining that law and equity had not yet diverged into two officially dis-
tinct types of remedies).
25 See id. at 544-45 (explaining the flexibility available to these courts because of the
limited number ofjudicial precedents and statutes).
26 Id. at 551 (describing the gradual decline of equity and the correspondent rise of for-
malism in the common law courts).
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fication set the stage for the rise of the Court of Chancery and the develop-
ment of two separate, and often competing, English court systems.
Chancery endeavored to fill gaps in the substance of the common law
and to provide the equitable relief that the common law courts were no
longer willing to dispense.27  To this end, Chancery began using injunc-
tions, 28 which likely were modeled on the earlier tradition of writs issued by
the Crown. Thus, equitable injunctions were issued to compensate for a
wide variety of deficiencies in the common law.29 Those injunctions that
were issued merely to plug holes in the law created relatively little resis-
tance throughout the English court system, and even allowed for coopera-
tion between the common law judges and Chancery.30 Far more controver-
sial, however, was the injunction issued in the name of equity in order to
halt or prevent the initiation of proceedings in a court of law.31 These anti-
suit injunctions constituted a direct challenge to the authority and legitimacy
of the courts of law.32
Both the early Chancellors and modem academic commentators have
stressed that "it is well understood that [an] injunction to stay proceedings in
courts of law is not directed against the court itself, but against the parties to
the proceeding." 33 Nevertheless, it is not surprising that the common law
27 See id. at 555 (discussing Chancery's role as compensating for the weaknesses of
common law outcomes).
28 See id. (discussing Chancery's use of the injunction to rectify "some defect in the
common law system").
29 See id. (explaining that injunctions were issued when common law had no appropriate
remedy, was unable to carry out a remedy, or common law procedures were "misused").
30 See 2 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 345 (Methuen & Co.
Ltd. and Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 4th ed. 1936) (noting that some judges even "advised parties,
who had an equitable claim to relief, to apply to the chancellor" (footnote omitted)).
31 See THOMAS C. SPELLING & JAMES HAMILTON LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
GOVERNING INJUNCTIONS 145 (1926) (noting that these injunctions "aroused the opposition
of courts of common law jurisdiction from the earliest stages of [their] exercise").
32 See I SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 461 (A.L. Goodhart
& H. G. Hanbury eds., Methuen & Co. 7th ed. 1956) ("The courts of common law saw well
enough that their supremacy was at stake."); D.M. KERLY, AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE
EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 107 (Cambridge, CJ. Clay & Sons
1890) (noting that the judges "feared that all suitors would be drawn into Chancery if the
power of the Chancellor to override or intercept their decisions became established").
33 SPELLING & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 184-85; see also Raack, supra note 21, at 568
(noting that the early Chancellors considered these injunctions justified because they "were
addressed only to the party, not to the court of law or the judge" (footnote omitted)); Edward
F. Sherman, Antisuit Injunction and Notice of Intervention and Preclusion: Complementary
Devices to Prevent Duplicative Litigation, 1995 BYU L. REV. 925, 927 (noting that the
"threat of sanctions under the contempt power serves to enforce the injunction," restricting the
parties' ability to pursue their case in the alternate forum (footnote omitted)).
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judges did not look kindly on the issuance of injunctions of this nature.
34
The injunctions effectively deprived the judges of their power to hear
cases 35 and set the stage for a centuries-long power struggle in England
between the courts of law and the courts of equity.
36
Despite the animosity that antisuit injunctions generated amongst the
common law courts, there can be little doubt that their use was necessary to
the development and efficacy of the Court of Chancery. 37 Without the abil-
ity to interfere in such a manner, it would have been impossible for Chan-
cery to 'carry out the jurisdiction it had assumed of controlling the law on
the principles of equity and conscience."' 3 8 Thus, much like modem courts,
the early Court of Chancery had to balance the protection of important in-
terests through antisuit injunctions with the concem for comity between the
courts.
Chancery's response to this dilemma was to develop a variety of rules
to regulate the issuance of this invasive type of injunction.39 Well into the
sixteenth century, the Chancellor had "almost unfettered discretion" to grant
injunctions. 40 But beginning with the tenure of Chancellor Thomas More
(1529 to 1532), Chancery made a conscious effort to limit its issuance of the
most offensive types of injunctions. 41 Over the next two centuries, succes-
34 See 4 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1360, at
973 (5th ed. 1994) (characterizing this judicial opposition as "long and severe"); Raack, supra
note 21, at 559 ("Tlhe reaction ... to the Chancellor's injunctions-at least to the injunctions
that interfered with common law proceedings-was ... one of some antagonism." (footnote
omitted)).
35 See Raack, supra note 21, at 559 ("When the Chancellor issued an injunction to a party
to halt a proceeding at law, the judges were deprived of their power to hear the case.").
36 See JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1360, at
2699-700 (3d ed. 1905) (noting the "long and severe opposition from the common law
judges" to the idea that Chancery's equitable rulings could defeat a recovery at law).
37 See id. ("Without this means of interference to protect the rights of its suitors, the court
of chancery could never have established, extended, and enforced its own jurisdiction.").
38 Raack, supra note 21, at 568 (quoting 1 G. SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF
THE COURT OF CHANCERY 673-74 (1846)).
39 See id. at 586-91 (discussing Francis Bacon's code of procedure and Lord Notting-
ham's manual of practice in Chancery, both of which limited the use of injunctions as instru-
ments of delay).
40 Id. at 570.
41 See 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 19, at 223 ("[More] made it a habit never to grant a
subpoena till he was satisfied that the plaintiff had some real ground of complaint." (footnote
omitted)); Raack, supra note 21, at 571 (noting that More's "probity" and "scrupulousness" in
issuing injunctions helped to dispel some of the hostility between Chancery and the common
law judges).
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sive Chancellors continued to add to the requirements necessary for an anti-
suit injunction to be issued.42
By the time of the American Revolution, the antisuit injunction was, if
not a disfavored device, a device used with circumspection. 43 Thus, it is not
surprising that one of the first statutes passed in the early history of the
United States was a restriction on the use of antisuit injunctions by the fed-
eral courts.
44
B. The Anti-Injunction Act
The relation of... the Courts of the United States to... the Courts of the
States is a very delicate matter that has occupied the thoughts of statesmen and
judges for a hundred years and can not be disposed of by a summary statement
that justice requires me to cut red tape and to intervene.
The hundreds of years of strife in England over the proper application
of antisuit injunctions could not have gone unnoticed by the early American
statesmen. One of the consequences of the new nation's experiment with
federalism was the creation of a dual system of sovereignty.46 The resulting
concurrent jurisdiction between the separate federal and state court systems
resembled the dual court system in England and implicated concerns about
the efficiency of such a system.47 Although the new state and federal courts
had more clearly delineated spheres of influence than had the Court of
Chancery and the English common law courts,48 the potential for conflict
42 See Raack, supra note 21, at 571-73, 586-91 (describing the development of proce-
dures to ensure that a party seeking an injunction had some real ground of complaint, to con-
finn the truth of the allegations made, and to define the breadth of the Chancellor's discretion
through citation to former decisions).
43 See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARV. L. REV. 49, 96-100 (1923) (recounting the heated debate in Congress over the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789 and its proposition that suits in equity would not be sustained when a
remedy could be had by law); cf. JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY 92-94, 101-06 (New York,
D. Appleton & Co. 1890) (noting the evidence of widespread hostility to Chancery practices
during the debates to the Judiciary Act of 1789).
44 See Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334, 334-35 (1793) (stating that "no writ of
injunction [shall] be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state").
45 5 TE SACCO-VANZETTI CAsE 5516 (Paul P. Appel 1969) (1928) (quoting a memo-
randum written by Justice Holmes).
46 See Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988) (noting "the Framers'
decision to authorize, and Congress' [sic] decision to implement, a dual system of federal and
state courts").
47 See SPELLING & LEWIS, supra note 31, at 21 (describing how the federal system is in-
dependent of the state court system in that "they coexist in the same territorial space, [but]
they... have no common superior").
41 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (delineating the scope of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts).
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between the two systems still existed.49 In 1793, Congress enacted what has
come to be known as the Anti-Injunction Act in an attempt to help prevent
any such conflict from developing between the courts in the United States*
50
In its original form, the AIA constituted a simple, one-line ban on all
antisuit injunctions issued by a federal court against a pending state court
action by stating that no "writ of injunction [shall] be granted to stay pro-
ceedings in any court of a state."51 Thus, from the earliest days of the Re-
public, rules governing antisuit injunctions have been statutorily prescribed
in the United States. For the first century of its existence, however, the fed-
eral courts largely ignored this provision and "applied the Act of 1793 as a
matter of course," rather than explicitly relying upon it for authority. 2
It was not until the 1874 codification of federal laws into the Revised
Statutes that the AIA was dusted off to become an important factor in the
49 For instance, in many cases, state and federal courts have overlapping jurisdiction, al-
lowing litigants a choice of forum. This is particularly problematic in the context of in rem
cases where both courts cannot effectively control the same piece of property. See, e.g., Kline
v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 235 (1922) ("The rank and authority of the [federal and
state] courts are equal but both courts cannot possess or control the same thing at the same
time, and any attempt to do so would result in unseemly conflict.").
"0 Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334 (1793). Although the legislative history of
the AIA is relatively sparse, former Attorney General Edmund Randolph recognized the po-
tential for problems similar to those experienced in England in a prominent report considered
by the House before the AIA passage. See 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, No. 17. These pa-
pers note that the proposed AIA would:
debar the district court from interfering with the judgements at law in the State
courts .... It is enough to split the same suit into one at law, and another in equity,
without adding a further separation, by throwing the common law side of the ques-
tion into the State courts, and the equity side into the federal courts.
Id. at 34. Since its passage, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized as the AIA's pur-
pose the avoidance of conflict between the state and federal courts. See, e.g., Toucey v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 135 (1941) ("The Act of 1793 expresses the desire of Con-
gress to avoid friction between the federal government and the states resulting from the intru-
sion of federal authority into the orderly functioning of a state's judicial process."); Taylor v.
Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 597 (1857) ("The legislation of Congress; in organizing the
judicial powers of the United States, exhibits much circumspection in avoiding occasions for
placing the tribunals of the States and of the Union in any collision.").
51 Act of Mar. 2, 1793, § 5, 1 Stat. at 334. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994) for the AIA as
currently amended.
.2 Toucey, 314 U.S. at 134 & n.5 (citing a number of early cases which, without men-
tioning the AIA, nevertheless held that federal courts did not have the power to interfere with
state court proceedings); see also 17 JAMES VM. MooRE Er AL., MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 121 [App.100] (3d ed. 1998) (noting that the "federal courts almost completely
ignored the anti-injunction provision" until the 1874 codification of federal laws into the Re-
vised Statutes).
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American legal system.5 3 The 1874 Congress significantly refined the ear-
lier AIA, specifically limiting the power of federal courts to enjoin state
proceedings while simultaneously including a statutory exception for bank-
ruptcy cases to the AIA's otherwise blanket ban.
54
.The statute remained unchanged until 1948, when it was amended to re-
flect its current language: "A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly author-
ized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments."
55
Because the scope of these three exceptions is critical to determining
when a court's jurisdiction is appropriately enforced through an antisuit in-
junction, a brief look at how courts have interpreted each of the exceptions
is warranted.
1. The First Exception: "By Act of Congress"
The first exception, "as expressly authorized by Act of Congress," 56 is
the descendant of the earlier statutory exception: "[iE]xcept in cases where
such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in
bankruptcy." 57 In the years between 1874 and the AIA's final amendment
in 1948, the Supreme Court came to recognize that other statutes might also
require federal courts to permit injunctions of state court proceedings. 8
Thus, prior to the 1948 amendment, the Supreme Court developed a number
of individual judicially-created exceptions to the AIA based on a variety of
statutes. 59 These exceptions varied from broad allowances for bankruptcy
53 See 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, at § 121 [App.100] (discussing the role that the
codified anti-injunction provision played in "prevent[ing] needless friction between the state
and federal courts" in a dual court system).
14 See Rev. Stat. of 1874, ch. 12, § 720, 18 Stat. 134, 137 (1874) ("The writ of injunction
shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a
State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy.").
55 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 155, § 2283, 62 Stat. 869, 968 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2283 (1994)).
56 Id.
57 Rev. Stat. of 1874, ch. 12, § 720, 18 Stat. at 137.
58 See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 233-34 (1972) (explaining that the Court "recog-
nized that exceptions must be made to [the AIA's] blanket prohibition if the import and pur-
pose of other Acts of Congress were to be given their intended scope"); see also 17 MoORE
ET AL., supra note 52, §121.06(1) ("Over time, the Supreme Court recognized that to give in-
tended effect to other federal statutes, courts needed to construe those statutes to permit in-
junction of state court proceedings." (footnote omitted)).
59 See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 132-34 (1941) (detailing the
various exceptions recognized by the Court in 1941, seven years before the 1948 amendment
to the AIA). These exceptions included: the Removal Acts of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1
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proceedings, the removal of actions, and interpleader, to relatively narrow
exceptions for limiting shipowners' liability.60 Rather than codifying all of
these exceptions, Congress instead chose to insert the blanket language, "as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress," in the 1948 Act.6 1 This general
language has left the question of exactly which statutes fall under this ex-
ception as a matter of some debate between the courts.
62
2. The Second Exception: "Where Necessary in Aid of Its Jurisdiction"
The second exception to the AIA's prohibition of federal injunctions
against state courts arises "where necessary in aid of [a federal court's] ju-
risdiction.' 63 In practice, this exception is invoked almost exclusively for in
rem cases in which the court's physical possession of the property involved
is critical to the court's ability to proceed with the cause and to grant the re-
lief sought.64 A simultaneous state court in rem action is particularly prob-
lematic because the two separate courts cannot both have control over the
piece of property in question, the disposition of which is critical to the
Stat. 73, 79, providing for the removal of actions to another court; Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43,
9 Stat. 635, limiting the liability of shipowners; The Interpleader Act of May 8, 1926, ch. 273,
44 Stat. 416, giving the district court hearing the interpleader action the power to enjoin par-
allel actions; and the Frazier-Lemke Act, ch. 204, § 75, 47 Stat. 1473 (1933), making petition-
ers under this Act subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court. See Toucey, 314
U.S. at 132-34. In so doing, the Toucey Court noted that "the language of the Act of 1793 was
unqualified," and that Congress had made only a "few withdrawals from this sweeping prohi-
bition" in the 150 years after it was enacted. Id. at 132.
60 See id. at 132-34 (discussing these exceptions). The interpleader exception, for exam-
ple, stemmed from statutory language which gave district courts explicit power to enjoin ac-
tions instituted by claimants which threatened the interpleader hearing. See The Interpleader
Act of May 8, 1926, ch. 273, § 2, 44 Stat. 416, 416 ("Notwithstanding any provision of the
Judicial Code to the contrary, said [district] court shall have power to ... issue an order of
injunction against each [claimant], enjoining them from instituting or prosecuting any suit or
proceeding in any State court....").
61 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
62 See 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, § 121.06(1) (noting that both the Supreme Court
and the lower federal courts are divided as to which statutes fall within the exception); see,
e.g., Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 640 (1977) (5-4 decision) (splitting the
Court on the issue of whether the Clayton Act qualified under the AIA's first exception);
Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 225 (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fell within the AIA's first excep-
tion).
63 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
64 See Gunderson v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 976 F. Supp. 818, 823 (N.D. Iowa 1997)
("Thus, where the federal court's jurisdiction is in rem and the state court action may effec-
tively deprive the federal court of the opportunity to adjudicate as to the res, the exception for
necessity 'in aid of jurisdiction' may be appropriate." (citation omitted)); 17 MOORE ET AL.,
supra note 52, § 121.07(2)(d)(i) (noting that the in rem exception is well-settled and that
"[flederal courts continue to find the narrow res exception included within the Anti-Injunction
Act's [second] exception").
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resolution of an in rem case.65 As a rule, in personam actions will not qual-
ify under this exception. 66 "When two sovereigns have concurrent in perso-
nam jurisdiction one court will ordinarily not interfere with or try to restrain
proceedings before the other."
67
3. The Third Exception: "To Protect or Effectuate Their Judgments"
The third exception to the AIA is known as the "relitigation excep-
tion.",68 This exception is "founded in the well-recognized concepts of res
judicata and collateral estoppel," 69 and it applies only to situations in which
federal forum action has already been completed.70  Under such circum-
stances, this exception may allow the federal court to enjoin a subsequent
state action which threatens to overturn its decision.71 Thus, in cases in
which either of these doctrines would normally preclude subsequent litiga-
tion, the AIA allows federal courts to protect their decisions by enforcing
these doctrines against state courts.72 The relitigation exception, however,
65 See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 235 (1922) (explaining that allowing
two courts to have control over the same property at the same time would lead to distasteful
conflict).
6 See id. at 230 (vacating an injunction in a case involving contractual obligations rather
than an in rem action, and stating that "[tihe rule, therefore, has become generally established
that where the action first brought is in personam and seeks only a personal judgment, another
action for the same cause in another jurisdiction is not precluded" (citations omitted)); Diane
P. Wood, Fine-Tuning Judicial Federalism: A Proposal for Reform of the Anti-Injunction
Act, 1990 BYU L. REv. 289, 302 (noting that "[iln spite of developments in other areas of
procedural law exposing the artificiality of the 'in rem/in personam' distinction, the... courts
still struggle to make sense of the distinction for purposes of [the second] exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act" (footnotes omitted)).
67 China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987) (ci-
tations omitted).
68 Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147 (1988).
69 id.
70 See id. at 148 ("[Ain essential prerequisite for applying the ['protect or effectuate']
exception is that the claims or issues which the federal injunction insulates from litigation in
state proceedings actually have been decided by the federal court."); see also 17 MOORE ET
AL., supra note 52, § 121.08 (noting that the relitigation exception only applies after an action
has been fully adjudicated).
71 See Atlantic Coast Line R.R v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295
(1970) ("[S]ome federal injunctive relief may be necessary to prevent a state court from so
interfering with a federal court's consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair
the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide that case."). The Supreme Court has
ruled, however, that the Full Faith and Credit Clause dictates that the injunction must be is-
sued against the state court before the state court has ruled on the res judicata effect of the
earlier federal decision. See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525 (1986)
(attempting to reconcile the AIA with the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
72 See Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 150-51 (upholding the district court's injunction of
the state courts from considering the petitioner's claim).
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like the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel upon which it is
based, has no application in a situation involving concurrent actions."
II. THE USE OF ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS AGAINST FOREIGN COURTS
A. Domestic Versus International Use ofAntisuit Injunctions
There is no international AIA to bar domestic courts from issuing anti-
suit injunctions against foreign courts. An antisuit injunction in this setting
nevertheless implicates concerns of international comity. These concerns
would seem to dictate that such injunctions rarely should be issued.74 The
dilemmas posed by compelling respect for a court's proceedings through the
issuance of an injunction are only compounded when the second action is
brought in a court of a foreign judicial system. It can be argued that all na-
tions, including the United States, have a vested interest in the unimpaired
functioning of their respective judicial systems. This Comment argues that,
except in rare circumstances, this interest should outweigh the interest of
any foreign nation in interfering with another nation's judicial system.
B. The Importance of Comity
"[C]omity is to be preferred to combat."
75
"Comity" is a critical, yet poorly defined, concept regulating relations
between courts. It has variously been defined as "good neighbourliness,
common courtesy and mutual respect,"76 as "friendly dealing[s] between
nations at peace,"77 and as "the recognition which one nation allows within
its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation."
78
When one federal court attempts to deny jurisdiction to another federal
court via an antisuit injunction, concerns regarding comity are implicated. 9
7 See, e.g., Santopadre v. Pelican Homestead & Say. Ass'n, 937 F.2d 268, 273 (5th Cir.
1991) ("The exception applies... only if the parties to the original action actually disputed
the issue and the trier of fact actually resolved it." (citations omitted)).
74 See infra Part II.B (discussing the role of comity in antisuit injunction suits).
75 Hayes Indus. v. Caribbean Sales Assocs., Inc., 387 F.2d 498, 502 (1st Cir. 1968).
76 British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1983] 3 All E.R. 375, 397 (C.A.) ("Judi-
cial comity is shorthand for good neighbourliness, common courtesy and mutual respect be-
tween those who labour in adjoining judicial vineyards.").
" Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 162 (1895) (defining comity in the international set-
ting).
78 Laura M. Salava, Balancing Comity with Antisuit Injunctions: Considerations Beyond
Jurisdiction, 20 J. LEGIS. 267, 267 (1994) (citing Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64).
79 See Edward F. Sherman, Antisuit Injunction and Notice of Intervention and Preclusion:
Complementary Devices to Prevent Duplicative Litigation, 1995 BYU L. REv. 925, 927
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The comity concerns inevitably raised when enjoining the proceedings of
another court are further amplified when the court is part of another sover-
eign entity's judicial system. Whether these concerns are compelling
enough to justify not issuing an injunction depends upon the relative im-
portance assigned to comity.
For some courts, the concept of comity seems to have little value unless
their decisions to issue injunctions will actually spawn an international inci-
80dent. Others, however, understand that the reciprocity inherent in comity
means that freely enjoining foreign actions will likely result in a response in
kind from foreign nations.8 1
C. The Circuit Split
The federal circuits have split dramatically on what standard to apply
with respect to the issuance of antisuit injunctions in the international set-
ting.82 The First, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits apply a very lax stan-
dard in determining the availability of antisuit injunctions against foreign
83courts. These circuits have determined that the mere duplication of parties
("When a federal court enjoins prosecution of a suit in another federal court, principles of
comity require that courts of coordinate jurisdiction exercise 'forbearance' by 'avoiding inter-
ference with the process of each other."' (quoting Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226,
229 (1922)).
so See Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that the is-
suance of the antisuit injunction in the present controversy did not by itself threaten relations
between the United States and Japan).
81 See Schimek, supra note 20, at 505 ("If domestic courts fail to follow comity and issue
anti-suit injunctions, foreign courts will likely respond in a similar manner in the future."); see
also, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 916-20 (1984) (detailing the long and
bitter court battle between the litigants involving antisuit injunctions used by both U.S. and
British courts); Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Bd., 75 D.L.R1 4th 1, 7 (B.C.
Ct. App. 1990) (determining that parallel proceedings in Texas amounted to "oppression"),
overruled by 102 D.L.IR 4th 96 (Can. 1993); Komberg v. Komberg, 70 D.L.R 4th 554, 559
(Man. Ct. Q.B. 1990) (issuing an antisuit injunction against a Minnesota court in a divorce
proceeding).
82 See Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1353-54 (6th Cir. 1992) (de-
scribing the various standards used to determine whether a foreign antisuit injunction should
be granted and the circuits that adhere to them); Salava, supra note 78, at 268-69 (describing
the differences in opinion among the circuits about the likely effect of using an antisuit in-
junction against a foreign tribunal). For a spirited debate on the issue, see Kaepa, Inc. v.
Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996), in which Judge Weiner, reflecting the majority's
support of the more relaxed Fifth Circuit standard, see id. at 627, and Judge Garza, arguing for
more deference to comity, see id. at 629-3 1, vigorously defend their respective positions.
83 See Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 433 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that comity considerations would not prevent a federal court, "even under the strict
cases," from issuing antisuit injunctions when the inability to plead res judicata could deprive
the requesting party of the benefit of a judgment); Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. Na-
tional Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming the district court's con-
sideration of the relevant factors, including the "convenience" to the parties involved, the "ef-
[Vol. 147:409
THE USE OFANTISUITINJUCTIONS
and issues in both suits is enough to warrant the issuance of an antisuit in-
junction.84
In Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the reasons these circuits be-
lieve that any duplicative foreign litigation is properly enjoinable 85  The
court argued that such duplicative litigation may be detrimental for a num-
ber of reasons. For example, it may frustrate a policy of the forum issuing
the injunction, be vexatious or oppressive, threaten the issuing court's in
rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction, or prejudice other equitable considera-
tions.
86
In contrast, the Second, Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits show considera-
bly more deference to international comity. In these circuits, foreign anti-
suit injunctions will only be issued in two situations: first, to protect the fo-
rum's jurisdiction, and second, to prevent evasion of the forum's important
public policies. 7
ficient administration of justice," and the potential prejudice to the parties in granting an anti-
suit injunction); In re Unterweser Reederei, 428 F.2d 888, 895 (5th Cir. 1970), vacated sub
nom. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (holding that "it was proper for
the district court to restrain Unterweser from proceeding in any other court"). But see Cana-
dian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578-79 (1st Cir. 1969) (vacat-
ing an injunction and holding that, "[a]lthough there are times when [principles of] comity
must... give way," the exception did not apply to the case at hand in which the matter of the
foreign suit concerned a separate right).
84 See Salava, supra note 78, at 268 (describing the lax standard applied by this group of
circuits).
8' See 652 F.2d at 854 (arguing for the "overriding interest [of the federal courts] in ap-
plying their own rules of procedure").
86 See id. at 855 (listing several circumstances that would justify enjoining foreign litiga-
tion).
87 See Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1355-58 (6th Cir. 1992) (not-
ing that an injunction will only be appropriate to protect a court's jurisdiction or to prevent a
party from evading the forum's policies by litigating in a foreign jurisdiction); Sea Containers
Ltd. v. Stena AB, 890 F.2d 1205, 1212-14 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that antisuit injunctions
may be granted to protect the court's jurisdiction, but finding that such protection was not
necessary in the present action); China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d
33, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that antisuit injunctions are proper when protecting the
court's jurisdiction or protecting important public policies, but finding that the district court
abused its discretion in granting an injunction in this case); Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 887 (3d Cir. 1982) (vacating the district
court's order enjoining the defendants from proceeding in England's High Court of Justice
and holding that "duplication of issues and the [defendant's] delay in filing the London ac-
tion.., alone did not justify the breach of comity among the courts of separate sovereignties"
(quoting Canadian Filters, 412 F.2d at 578)).
The first of these two conditions, "to protect the forum's jurisdiction," is substantially
similar to the second exception to the A!A, "where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction." 28
U.S.C. § 2283. The second condition, "to prevent evasion of the forum's important public
policies," is not as well defined. It is apparent, though, that a mere interest in judicial econ-
omy will not suffice to satisfy this standard. See Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1357 (rejecting the
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The two standards employed by the different circuit courts each appear
to have their own drawbacks. Based upon their own interpretations of the
relatively nebulous concept of comity, the two groups of circuits seem to
have created standards which are either too lax (in the case of the First,
Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits), or too strict (in the case of the Second,
88Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits).
1. The "Duplication of Parties and Issues" Standard
"We decline, however, to require a district court to genuflect before a vague
and omnipotent notion of comity every time that it must decide whether to en-
join a foreign action." 89
The lax standard followed by the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Cir-
cuits is remarkable in the utter lack of respect it affords the courts of foreign
sovereigns. By issuing antisuit injunctions upon the mere showing of dupli-
cation of parties and issues, this standard makes it easier to grant antisuit
injunctions internationally than at any level of domestic court interaction.
90
In general, at the domestic level, there is a presumption that parallel actions
plaintiff's argument that the interest in a "'just, speedy, and inexpensive' trial was an impor-
tant public policy (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1)).
88 Compare Philips Med. Sys. Int'l B.V. v. Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 1993)
(noting that although comity may be one factor in granting or denying equitable relief, it "is
entitled to no fixed weight in that consideration," and suggesting that evidence of the impor-
tance of comity can best be shown by a concrete and persuasive demonstration that a particu-
lar injunction would threaten foreign relations), with Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1354-55 (arguing
that comity is critical for developing a stable international marketplace, and that disrespect for
this concept will negatively affect "cooperation and reciprocity between corets of different
nations" and lead foreign courts to "reciprocate such disrespect").
89 Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996) (displaying the rather
dim view of the importance of international comity taken by the Fifth Circuit).
90 Federal versus state antisuit injunctions are governed by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2283. State attempts to enjoin federal proceedings have been held illegal by the Su-
preme Court. See Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 411-12 (1964) (holding such in-
junctions illegal, but noting a possible exception for cases in rem). The law concerning state
attempts to enjoin proceedings in other states is still unsettled, but clearly involves more than
just a duplication of parties and issues. See generally Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S.
Ct. 657, 664-65 n.9 (1998) (listing authorities and discussing the involvement of full faith and
credit and resjudicata concerns in this type of injunction). Even federal court antisuit injunc-
tions against other federal courts are normally based upon a "forbearance" standard, although
this varies somewhat according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Kline v. Burke
Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922) (noting that when a federal court enjoins the prosecu-
tion of a suit in another federal court, principles of comity require that courts of coordinate
jurisdiction exercise "forbearance" by "avoiding interference with the process of each other"
(quoting Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 182 (1884)); see also infra notes 93-94 and ac-
companying text (establishing compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a) in order to prevent
a multiplicity of suits).
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will be allowed to go forward unless there is some special reason why they
should not.91
Perhaps the closest domestic analog to the "duplication of parties and
issues" standard can be found in the analyses of the federal courts when in-
voking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a). This comparison is further
strengthened because, ironically, many of the antisuit injunctions issued
against foreign courts are issued pursuant to this domestic rule of proce-
dure.
92
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) establishes a set of "compulsory"
counterclaims that must be brought in the original federal action or not at
all.93 The justifications for compulsory counterclaims are normally couched
in terms of promoting judicial economy or convenience. 94 The Supreme
Court has defined the purpose of Rule 13(a) as: "[T]o prevent multiplicity
of actions and to achieve resolution in a single lawsuit of all disputes arising
91 See Robinson v. Jardine Ins. Brokers Int'l Ltd., 856 F. Supp. 554, 560 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
("Where judgment is sought in personam, two courts with concurrent jurisdiction may pro-
ceed with litigation at least until judgment is obtained in one case which may be used as res
judicata in the other. This principle applies even where one action is foreign." (citations
omitted)).
92 See, e.g., Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 628 n.14 (deciding the case on other grounds, but noting
that its holding was "consistent with the purpose of Rule 13"); Seattle Totems Hockey Club,
Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981) (agreeing with the district
court that "the policies animating Rule 13(a) and the rationale of the cases upholding injunc-
tions against subsequently-filed federal court actions applied with equal force to this case
where the compulsory counterclaim was brought in the courts of Canada"); Butte Mining PLC
v. Smith, No. 92-36890, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 12331, at *5 (9th Cir. May 17, 1994) (fol-
lowing Seattle Totems in stating that "[u]nder the law of this circuit, where a party seeks to
litigate a compulsory counterclaim in a foreign country,... the district court has the discre-
tion to enter an injunction against the foreign proceeding").
93 The text of Rule 13(a) reads as follows:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving
the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the trans-
action or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the
action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2)
the opposing party brought suit upon the claim by attachment or other process by
which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on that
claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13.
FED. R. Crv. P. 13(a). The language of this section has been altered very little since its intro-
duction 60 years ago. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), with FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (1938)
(amended 1948).
94 See 6 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 13, at § 1409, at 48 (stating that "Rule 13(a) is de-
signed to foster the strong federal policy of promoting judicial efficiency"). See generally
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL Er AL., CivIL PROCEDURE 350 (1985) (discussing the competing poli-
cies of adjudicating all legal disputes between two parties in one action on the one hand, and
"preventing lawsuits from becoming unduly complicated" on the other).
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out of common matters." 95 Occasionally, concern for protecting parties
from vexatious litigation is also expressed. 96 It is also generally easier and
cheaper for parties to have all of their claims heard at once. Thus, the com-
pulsory counterclaim rule may be invoked to limit the ability of one of the
litigants to harass the others by bringing related suits which create "unnec-
essary delay, substantial inconvenience and expense."
97
Given what must be assumed to be the shared interests of the federal
courts in the efficient management of the federal court system, the discre-
tionary standard for the issuance of an antisuit injunction between two fed-
eral courts in this situation seems warranted. The extension of such a lax
standard into the international setting, however, seems extremely inappro-
priate given the divergent interests of federal and foreign courts. The justi-
fication for ignoring comity under a discretionary standard rests on the as-
sumption that both courts involved share common interests in the case.
98
95 Southern Constr. Co. v. Pickard, 371 U.S. 57, 60 (1962); see also FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., supra note 94, at 350 (noting that one of the policies of compulsory counterclaims is "the
desire to adjudicate all legal disputes between two parties in one action"); 6 WRIGrr ET AL.,
supra note 13, at § 1409, at 46 (noting that the point of the compulsory counterclaim rule is to
"avoidfo a wasteful multiplicity of litigation").
96 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 94, at 188 (noting that "[tjhe ease of instituting
proceedings under the broad bases of jurisdiction that currently exist" makes litigants vulner-
able to vexatious litigation).
97 Butte Mining, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 12331, at *5 (noting that in the Ninth Circuit, the
district court has the discretion to enter an injunction against another proceeding when a party
seeks to assert a compulsory counterclaim in a foreign jurisdiction which may inconvenience
the opposing party); see also Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1353 (6th
Cir. 1992) (noting that some "courts rely primarily upon considerations of vexatiousness or
oppressiveness" when considering these actions).
98 This is so even ignoring those cases that choose to apply a domestic rule of court pro-
cedure against a foreign court, such as when courts use Rule 13(a) to justify issuing an in-
junction against a foreign court. See Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey
League, 652 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming the district court's injunction under Rule
13(a) against a Canadian action where "the validity of the ... agreements will be a central
issue in both the Canadian and American litigations"). It is particularly difficult to see how a
rule like Rule 13(a), which is designed primarily to promote efficiency within the federal judi-
cial system, could be used to justify denying an entirely separate judicial system the right to
hear a case. Simply put, if the foreign tribunal does not mind wasting its resources on a dupli-
cative case, why should the federal court interfere? Whether the foreign court hears such a
case or not has little effect on the federal court proceedings. The case will still go forward,
and any holding from such a case will not result in a complete res judicata bar on the federal
proceeding, because the subject of the foreign court's case is merely a compulsory counter-
claim issue. Instead the foreign decision will, at most, bar litigation of only some issues
through collateral estoppel.
In addition, although res judicata and collateral estoppel may apply to cases heard in for-
eign courts if the foreign forum is adequate, courts "do not, with any degree of predictability,
grant res judicata effect to other nations' judicial judgments." Julie E. Dowler, Note, Forging
Finality: Searching for a Solution to the International Double-Suit Dilemma, 4 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 363, 368 (1994). Thus, perhaps the most important consequence of allow-
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Although such an assumption seems warranted where two federal courts are
proceeding under a shared rule of procedure such as Rule 13(a), it is diffi-
cult to justify in cases involving the courts of two separate sovereigns.
Ignoring the differing interests of a foreign tribunal overlooks the les-
sons learned centuries ago in England about the disruptive effect of antisuit
injunctions.99 Further, judicial strife at the international level may be even
more disruptive than the domestic strife in England during the early years of
the Court of Chancery, because, internationally, there is no final arbitrator to
resolve conflicts among the various sovereign courts. Thus, in the infamous
case of Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,00 the vigor-
ous pursuit of antisuit injunctions and anti-antisuit injunctions'0 ' of English
and American courts eventually created a gridlock that not only denied po-
tential relief to the plaintiff, but also necessitated the intervention of the
English Executive Branch and the House of Lords.
02
By treating foreign tribunals as if they were merely fellow domestic
federal courts rather than the courts of a separate sovereign, these circuits do
not seem to acknowledge the similarity between foreign courts and another
set of domestic courts from separate sovereignties-the state courts. The
state courts, of course, are protected within our federal system by the blan-
ket prohibition of the AIA, subject only to the three specific exceptions dis-
cussed previously.103 It seems logical that foreign courts, themselves part of
an international legal community full of overlapping sovereign legal sys-
tems, should be accorded a similar level of respect.
2. The Stricter Standard
The Second, Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits' standard, which allows the
issuance of antisuit injunctions only to either protect the forum's jurisdiction
ing a foreign action to proceed until judgment is the effect that a foreign declaration of non-
liability may have on a judgment eventually rendered by a U.S. court. See id. at 372 (giving
examples of cases in which U.S. judgments have been effectively useless abroad where a for-
eign court has already issued a judgment of nonliability). If the defendant is able to gain a
negative declaratory judgment in the country where his assets are, then the "United States
plaintiff's judgment is worthless.' Id. at 369.
99 See supra Part L.A (discussing the early history of the antisuit injunction).
'0o 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
101 An "anti-antisuit injunction" is a defensive device used to prevent another court from
issuing an antisuit injunction against the issuing court. See Schimek, supra note 20, at 501
(describing how an anti-antisuit injunction typically proceeds).
102 See id. at 507 (describing the Laker Airways case as an "international incident");
Dowler, supra note 98, at 378 (noting that "all notions of international comity were ignored").
103 See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994) ("A court... may not grant an injunction to stay pro-
ceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where neces-
sary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.").
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or prevent evasion of the forum's important public policies, seems to be a
better, but also flawed, approach. 10 4 The issue is not that this standard is too
lax, but that it may be too strict.
In essence, these circuits lay down a flat prohibition against antisuit in-
junctions in the international setting except in the aforementioned two cir-
cumstances. Thus, the approach by this group of circuits seems to be analo-
gous to the approach taken by the AIA toward the granting of federal
injunctions against the state courts.
105
In fact, the first exception to the international prohibition created by this
group of circuits seems closely related to, if not finctionally identical to, the
106second exception to the AIA. The international exception, however, may
actually be a bit broader than the exception in the AIA. Both exceptions
contemplate primary application to cases in rem, where actual possession of
the property in dispute is necessary to render justice effectively.10 7 The in-
ternational exception, however, also has an additional application to in per-
sonam proceedings "if a foreign court is not merely proceeding in parallel
but is attempting to carve out exclusive jurisdiction over the action."'1 8 No
such extension of the second exception to the AIA is generally recognized.
104 See, e.g., Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354 (summarizing the
standard employed by these circuits).
105 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (noting especially the three enumerated exceptions to the
AIA), with Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1353-54 (summarizing the standard used by the Second and
D.C. Circuits at the time, and since joined by the Third and Sixth Circuits).
106 Compare the international test explained in Gau Shan ("to protect the forum court's
jurisdiction"), 956 F.2d at 1353, with the second exception to the AIA ("where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction"), 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
107 See Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1356 ("Where jurisdiction is based on the presence of
property within the court's jurisdictional boundaries, a concurrent proceeding in a foreign ju-
risdiction poses the danger that the foreign court will order the transfer of the property out of
the jurisdictional boundaries of the first court."); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, §
121.07[1] (describing the applications of the second exception to the AIA and noting that in
rem actions are the only established use of the exception).
108 China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987)
(noting a second circumstance under which application of the "protect the forum's jurisdic-
tion" exception to the stricter international standard should be applied). The court in China
Trade was specifically referring to the actions of the district court in Laker Airways after it
became obvious that the antisuit injunctions issued by the English court in that case would
effectively remove the district court's jurisdiction to hear the case. See Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 933-34 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Upon hearing that
one defendant had been granted an antisuit injunction by an English court, the Laker Airways
court issued its own antisuit injunctions against the remaining defendants to prevent them
from following a similar strategy. See id. at 917-21.
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A possible explanation for this distinction is that such situations have tradi-
tionally been covered by the AIA's first exception.
0 9
The second exception to the international standard adopted by the Sec-
ond, Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits, "to prevent evasion of the forum's im-
portant public policies,"" 0) is less easy to correlate with the AIA."' Poten-
tially, this exception might be broad enough to encompass both the first and
third exceptions to the AIA.112 Anything which has been specifically men-
tioned by "Act of Congress" might well be deemed to be an important pub-
lic policy. Similarly, protecting or effectuating the judgments of the federal
courts may also qualify as an important public policy. It is the vagueness of
this exception to the stricter international injunction standard, however, that
is problematic. Depending on how "important public policy" is defined, the
exception could either spiral out of control, and allow antisuit injunctions
for any number of spurious reasons, or it could be interpreted so narrowly
that the issuance of an injunction could be almost impossible outside of the
"protect the forum's jurisdiction" exception.
Thus, although the stricter standard adopted by these circuits takes an
approach similar to that espoused in the AIA by presumptively barring anti-
suit injunctions unless one of a very few exceptions applies, and although
the AIA and this standard both recognize an exception in aid of the issuing
court's jurisdiction, the circuits' adoption of an ill-defined "important public
policy" exception leaves the true extent of their bar against international
antisuit injunctions unresolved.
III. USING THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT AS A MODEL SOLUTION
While the circuits continue to choose sides in this debate, the world
continues to grow more economically interdependent. 113 International busi-
nesses need to be able to predict the likely outcome of their actions, and
'9 See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (focusing on the first exception: "except as expressly authorized
by Act of Congress"); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, §§ 121.06-07 (explaining the interac-
tion of the first two exceptions to the AIA).
.. Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1354.
11 As discussed below, the extent of this broadly worded exception is difficult to deter-
mine, and this uncertainty interestingly adds an element of unpredictability to the standard
adopted by the Second, Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (focusing on the first exception---"except as expressly author-
ized by Act of Congress," and the third exception---"to protect or effectuate its judgements").
13 See Alex Y. Seita, Preface to Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429, 429 (1997) ("As the twentieth century comes to a close ... [g]reater
numbers of domestic businesses, employees, and consumers have looked to foreign markets,
investors and products for economic prosperity as well as economic competition.").
1998]
430 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW
therefore need a stable legal environment. 114 At present, it is impossible to
predict how a U.S. district court would rule on a motion for an international
antisuit injunction without knowing the exact location of the court. As a re-
suit, the fate of domestic and foreign entities involved in disputes that could
potentially confer jurisdiction on both U.S. and foreign courts may be de-
termined by an accident of geography. It seems quite arbitrary that the U.S.
circuit in which an entity chooses to do business might effectively deter-
mine whether or not that entity can maintain a lawsuit in a foreign forum.
Under such circumstances, even an ill-conceived rule such as that promul-
gated by the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits might be superior to
the current state of confusion and contention amongst the courts.
115
There seems to be a variety of ways to address this problem, several of
which have been suggested by other authors. Some of the possibilities in-
clude: an international treaty, an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a Supreme Court decision in the field, allowing the circuits to
sort the question out for themselves, and congressional action. 116 Of these
options, only two--a Supreme Court decision and congressional action---
seem either likely or practical! n7
Eight of the twelve circuits have now taken sides on this issue, and thus
it appears ripe for review by the Supreme Court. With little statutory basis
114 See Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the WTO Sys-
tem, 44 DEPAuL L. REv. 1097, 1101 (1995) ("[l]n the globalized economy of today, it is nec-
essary to maintain a stable legal order in the world trade.").
11 See Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 626-27 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting the de-
bate between the circuits over which standard to use, and the importance of international
comity).
116 See e.g., Dowler, supra note 98, at 401 (proposing a "multilateral convention on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements"); Salava, supra note 78, at 269-70 (sug-
gesting an amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65-injunctions--to specifically
deal with foreign antisuit injunctions).
117 A universal international treaty, although having the advantage of reciprocity from
other nations, seems to be a doubtful enterprise. Getting a large group of nations, many of
which have quite distinct legal systems, to agree on a universal set of judicial procedures may
not be a realistic option.
Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for this purpose also seems to be an un-
likely solution. First, how much deference to extend to the notion of international comity is
more a question of substantive policy than a question of procedure, and may thus fall outside
the purview of the Federal Judicial Conference. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994) (forbidding
the enactment of rules that "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right"); see also Peter
G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1683
(1995) (discussing the controversy in the 1970s over whether the rules committee had ex-
ceeded its authority in promulgating the Federal Rules of Evidence by abridging substantive
rights). Second, with a sharp circuit split and nothing approaching a consensus on the issue
amongst the judiciary, it would be difficult to promulgate any sort of meaningful rule.
Finally, as mentioned before, allowing the current conflict amongst the circuits to persist
might be the worst option of all.
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to rely upon, however, any such review would likely constitute no more
than a review of the historical importance of the nebulous notion of comity.
Although there is no reason why the Court could not conduct such a review,
the "fuzzy" nature of the concept of comity, along with the potential politi-
cal and foreign policy implications of any such decision, might deter the
Court from stepping into the fray absent guidance from Congress.
A more effective answer could be provided by congressional action.
Although unilateral action by Congress lacks the reciprocity of a multilat-
eral treaty, a carefully worded statute could protect American interests while
still accounting for the importance of international judicial comity. Addi-
tionally, Congress has been willing to involve itself occasionally in ques-
tions of judicial procedure, especially when those procedures have political
implications. 118 Finally, it was Congress that regulated the field of antisuit
injunctions between the federal and state courts by enacting the AIA.
Therefore, similar action to regulate the use of these injunctions (this time,
albeit, between federal and foreign courts) would not be unprecedented 1 9
In either case, whether it be via the Supreme Court or through congres-
sional action, the model which should be used in constructing the new law is
the AIA.120 That statute, addressing relations between federal and state
courts, implicates issues similar to those raised in the debate over comity's
importance to relations between the federal and foreign courts. Both situa-
tions involve the courts of separate sovereigns that, at times, find them-
selves with overlapping jurisdiction. Furthermore, the AIA was based at
least partly on the same notions of comity 121 that would have to underlie any
proposed law in the international field.
118 See, e.g., Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994)) (requiring each U.S. district court to develop and
implement a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan in order to improve case manage-
ment, reduce litigation costs, and promote efficiency); Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109 Stat. 737-49 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. (Supp. I 1996)) (setting forth new procedures designed to reduce the
amount of abusive private securities class action litigation).
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (regulating the use of anti-suit injunctions between federal and
state courts). It should be noted that congressional action, whether in the case of the AIA or in
the international setting, does not bind the states. Consequently, individual states will con-
tinue to have their own standards with which to govem the use of anti-suit injunctions.
120 See id.
121 See Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 515
(1955) (implying that the AIA was based on principles of comity); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra
note 52, at § 121.02 ("The Act is based on notions of comity and a need to prevent needless
friction between state and federal courts.' (footnote omitted)).
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The Second, Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits have already devised a
standard which somewhat resembles that codified in the AIA.122 In both the
standard devised by these circuits and the standard adopted in the AIA, a
prohibition against antisuit injunctions is the baseline, subject to a limited
number of exceptions. Although the indefinite language of the second ex-
ception to their prohibition against antisuit injunctions against foreign
courts123 is problematic, the overall test developed by this group of circuits
strikes a similar balance to that struck by the AIA.
Even the position adopted by the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Cir-
cuits, which seems to reject international comity, is not totally irreconcilable
with a law based upon the AIA. In Seattle Totems, the court attempted to
further explain its standard by stating that "foreign litigation may be en-
joined when it would (1) frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunc-
tion; (2) be vexatious or oppressive; (3) threaten the issuing courts [sic] in
rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction; or (4) prejudice other equitable considera-
tions." 124 The third of these categories clearly resembles both the second
exception to the AIA and the first exception to the standard employed by the
stricter circuits. 125 The first exception listed above is also merely a variant
of the second exception to the stricter standard. 126 Of course this exception
is open to a tremendous amount of latitude in interpretation, but it is the
second and fourth categories identified by the Seattle Totems court that are
truly problematic. The great amount of indeterminacy and discretion inher-
ent in these two categories open the door, in the Ninth Circuit at least, to
foreign antisuit injunctions almost as a matter of right, rather than as a rare
exception.
If either the Supreme Court or Congress is to address this issue, it is
precisely such indeterminate language, and, consequently, such broad grants
'2 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (the AIA as amended in 1948), with Gau Shan Co. v.
Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th Cir. 1992) (summarizing the standard used by
this group of circuits).
" See Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1354 (noting that "to prevent evasion of the forum's im-
portant public policies" is one of only two proper grounds upon which "to grant a foreign an-
tisuit injunction").
124 Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 855 (9th
Cir. 1981).
'2 Compare id. at 855 (stating that foreign litigation may be enjoined when it would
"threaten the issuing courts [sic] in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction"), with 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(stating that a federal court may stay a state proceeding "where necessary in aid of its juris-
diction"--commonly understood to mean when the case is in rem), and Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at
1354 (stating that foreign litigation may be enjoined "to protect the forum's jurisdiction").
126 Compare Seattle Totems, 652 F.2d at 855 (stating that foreign litigation may be en-
joined when it would "fi-ustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction"), with Gau Shan,
956 F.2d at 1354 (stating that an antisuit injunction may be issued to "prevent evasion of the
forum's important public policies").
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of discretion as those utilitized by the Ninth Circuit that must be avoided.
The AIA bars the use of antisuit injunctions by federal courts against state
courts except when absolutely necessary. Any new standard for the inter-
national use of antisuit injunctions, whether announced by the Supreme
Court or enacted as law by Congress, should impose a standard similar to
that codified in the AIA.
CONCLUSION
Within the federal system, the tremendous discretion given to the courts
in issuing antisuit injunctions invites them to ignore comity and mutual re-
spect in the name of judicial economy. The problems this may cause be-
tween various federal courts can perhaps be justified by the benefits con-
ferred upon the federal court system as a whole, and by the assumption that
all of the federal courts share a common interest in the system's efficiency.
It seems much more difficult, however, to justify enjoining the courts of an-
other sovereign entity which may well have legitimate interests divergent
from those of our federal court system.
In the United States, this hesitancy is further supported by the existence
of one of the nation's oldest statutes, the Anti-Injunction Act of 1793. This
act forbids federal court injunctions against state courts in all but a few nar-
rowly defined circumstances. 127 The concerns raised by the use of domestic
and foreign antisuit injunctions are sufficiently similar, and the dictates of
comity between the courts of different sovereigns sufficiently powerful, to
argue against the unprincipled use of an invasive device such as the antisuit
injunction in the international setting as well.
The pronounced split in the views of the various circuits on how to cope
with these conflicting interests make this issue ripe for either the Supreme
Court or Congress to address in the future. In any case, the sharp circuit
split presents the Court, Congress, and any of the circuits who have not yet
taken a position, with a clear choice on how much weight comity, as op-
posed to judicial efficiency, should be given when considering whether to
issue an antisuit injunction against another sovereign court.
"2' See supra Part I.B.1-3 (describing the three exceptions to the AIA).
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